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 Increasing visibility of sexual minorities—those who identify as part of the 
LGBTQ+ community—stimulates advancement in the metaphysics of gender. 
Two positions are available for detailing gender: gender essentialism and gender 
non-essentialism. Essentialism says that gender requires essential gender 
qualities; properties that gender must necessarily have. Non-essentialism denies 
the existence of essential gender qualities and defines gender as a conglomeration 
of accidental gender qualities; properties that become associated with gender, but 
are not necessary to gender. In​ Gender Trouble​ (2002), Judith Butler objects to 
the gender binary. She explains the binary as emerging from a gender matrix. 
However, she protests against the assumptions of the gender matrix, thereby 
calling the binary as a whole into question. As an alternative to the traditional 
view, Butler proposes a novel gender system: the gender performativity theory​. 
Butler also considers the ethical implications of the traditional gender system, 
arguing that it produces and maintains gender inequality. Her performativity 
theory of gender, ​which describes gender as a continuous set of actions coded 
according to gender,​ is an attempt to reduce this injustice. In this paper, I will 
provide objections to Butler’s rejections of the matrix and then object to her view 
of gender. 
Section I is devoted to the gender matrix. In section I A, I will present the 
gender matrix. In section I B, I will present Butler’s objections to the matrix. 
Finally, in section I C, I will present my responses to Butler. Section II is 
concerned with Butler’s performativity theory of gender. In section II A, I will 
present the theory and, in section II B, I will discuss its fallacies and concerning 
implications. 
 
I A 
Butler explains that the gender matrix produces two intelligible genders, which 
establish the gender binary. She says that, “‘Intelligible’ genders are those in 
which some sense institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity 
among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire” (Ibid., 23). In other words, the 
matrix validates the identities of those who possess particular configurations of 
biological sex, gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation. There 
are two intelligible genders: 1) cisgender heterosexual men, people with male 
genitalia who identify as men and are attracted exclusively to women, and 2) 
cisgender heterosexual women, people with female genitalia who identify as 
women and are attracted exclusively to men. The dimorphic quality of intelligible 
genders emerges from the assumption that biological sex, of which there are two, 
produces essential gender qualities exclusive to each sex. Thus, the sex of the 
genitalia, whether it is male or female, dictates the essential gender qualities 
 
 present in the individual. People who fail to satisfy the intelligible gender 
conditions are termed “unintelligible” and perceived to be "developmental failures 
or logical impossibilities from within that domain” (Ibid., 24). According to the 
matrix, any person who is not a cisgender heterosexual man or woman are of the 
unintelligible gender. Thus, discrimination appears to be inherent to the binary 
system, as intelligible genders are accepted while unintelligible genders are 
rejected. Butler presents the gender matrix in order to explain the gender binary, 
but in no way does she accept it.  
I B 
In her first response to the matrix, Butler argues that the logic supporting the 
matrix fails to entail dimorphic intelligible genders. According to the matrix, two 
particular combinations of biological sex, gender identity, gender expression, and 
sexual orientation are required for an identity to be intelligible. She notes that 
assuming a binary construction of sex does not entail a binary construction of 
gender because the gender qualities associated with men are not exclusive to the 
male sex and the gender qualities associated with women are not exclusive to the 
female sex. Consider a stereotypical quality of men in the United States: 
preference for red meat. However, this preference is not exclusive to cisgender 
heterosexual men. Cisgender heterosexual women can also have a preference for 
red meat. Because gender qualities such as preference for red meat are not 
exclusively related to a particular intelligible gender, Butler claims that "the 
sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and 
culturally constructed genders" (Ibid., 10). Thus, she concludes, "a gender cannot 
be said to follow from a sex in any one way" (Ibid., 10). Butler objects to the 
matrix because it establishes essential gender qualities that are present in both 
intelligible genders. Her objection rests on the assumption that essential gender 
qualities require exclusivity. She observes that no gender qualities are exclusive to 
a particular gender, which results in her rejection of essential gender qualities. In 
rejecting essential gender qualities, Butler denies the gender matrix because it 
requires essential gender qualities. 
Butler continues to critique the matrix by attacking its assumption that 
biological sex possesses essential qualities. She poses a series of questions 
intended to illustrate the definitional vagueness of sex and arrives at the following 
conclusion (Ibid., 10-11): 
 
If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct 
called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was 
 
 always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between 
sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. 
 
Given its association with a number of definitions, Butler is skeptical about 
biological sex containing essential qualities. Her skepticism emerges from the 
assumption that the unanimous judgment of a group entails essential qualities. 
Considering a person who deviates from the biological norm will help clarify her 
argument. A person may possess most characteristics typical of the male sex, 
including XY sex chromosomes, male hormone levels, and a penis. However, this 
person was born without testicles. Is this person any less male than a person with 
two testicles? Butler anticipates that responses to this question would differ. 
Remember that her view assumes homogenous judgment to be evidence of 
essential sex qualities. So, under her view, the diversity in responses reveals that 
biological sex does not possess essential qualities, resulting in her rejection of the 
gender binary. 
 
I C 
 
Butler’s initial objection to the gender matrix emerges from the assumption that 
exclusivity is necessary for essential qualities. She presents qualities possessed by 
both men and women to conclude that gender has no qualities exclusive to itself. 
However, essential qualities do not require exclusivity. Recall that essential 
qualities are defined as properties that an object must have. This definition allows 
for an object to possess a quality that is essential to itself, but not exclusive to 
itself. Therefore, multiple objects can possess the same essential quality. In the 
context of the gender matrix, this means that one intelligible gender could possess 
an essential quality and that quality could also be essential to the other intelligible 
gender. In other words, the matrix allows for gender qualities, such as preference 
for red meat, to be essential to one or both of the intelligible genders. Thus, Butler 
is mistaken in assuming that essential gender qualities must be exclusive to a 
particular gender.  
In her second objection to the gender matrix, Butler responds to the 
assumption that biological sex is dimorphic. She uses the definitional multiplicity 
of biological sex to argue that biological sex does not possess essential qualities. 
In this position, she makes the assumption that unanimous judgment is required 
for essentiality. However, unanimous judgment does not entail essential qualities. 
Once again, recall that essential qualities are defined as properties that an object 
must have. The essentiality of an object’s properties is unaffected by external 
judgments, just as it is unaffected by exclusivity. Consider a bachelor. It is 
essential that this person is an unmarried man. Some may observe this man and 
 
 assume he is unmarried. Others may observe this man and assume he is married 
because of the gold ring he wears on his ring finger. However, this man is not 
legally married, he just enjoys wearing a gold band on his ring finger. The 
external judgments regarding this man’s marital status do not affect the essential 
quality of a bachelor: one who is an unmarried man. Likewise, the external 
judgments of biological sex do not affect its essentiality, thereby invalidating 
Butler’s counter argument. Her rejection of the matrix requires the assumption 
that unanimous judgment entails essential qualities. However, this assumption is 
false, so she is not justified in rejecting the matrix. 
 
II A 
 
Butler denies the gender matrix and proposes an original conceptualization of 
gender called the gender performativity theory. Her theory concludes that "within 
the inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be 
performative—that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be” (Ibid., 33). 
The gender performativity theory rejects essential gender qualities and establishes 
gender as actions that arise from accidental qualities. Butler references 
Nietzsche’s ​On the Genealogy of Morals​ to clarify her theory. He says that “there 
is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction 
added to the deed—the deed is everything” (Nietzsche, 1887, 45). Although “the 
doer” and “the deed” appear to be separate objects, Nietzsche argues that they are 
the same. Butler uses this logic to ground the gender performativity theory, which 
explains gender and gendered actions as the same object. According to the theory, 
gender is a performance made up of actions coded gender-wise by culture. In 
American culture, women are associated with behaviors like body hair removal 
and sitting cross-legged. The gender performativity theory says that these 
behaviors literally are womanhood because womanhood is a composition of 
actions coded woman-wise. Butler’s theory was critical to the development of 
feminist philosophy, a sphere of thought devoted to achieving gender equality. 
Feminists used the gender performativity theory in an attempt to dismantle gender 
essentialism and provide a stronger argument for gender non-essentialism.  
 
II B 
 
In its attempt to define gender, the gender performativity theory demonstrates two 
sets of circular reasoning, with one resulting from the other. The theory initially 
encounters circularity in its classification of gender. It defines gender as actions 
coded according to that gender. This definition of gender threatens the concept of 
gender because it relies on itself to explain itself. If gender is defined as actions 
 
 coded according to that gender, then gender requires actions, but these actions 
require a concept of gender. Thus, gender relies on itself and the first issue of 
circularity emerges. This issue arises because the gender performativity theory 
rejects essential gender qualities. An object can possess either essential or 
accidental qualities, so by denying essential gender qualities, the view assumes 
accidental gender qualities. This means that all of the qualities associated with 
gender are not necessary to gender, from which a second circularity issue 
emerges. The circularity of accidental gender qualities looks like this: women 
prefer pink because they are feminine, but femininity includes a preference for 
pink. These accidental gender qualities fall into an endless regress, with one 
accidental gender quality developing from another accidental gender quality. 
These two sets of circularity, 1) that gendered actions require a gender concept 
and 2) that accidental gender qualities require other accidental gender qualities, 
present grave issues for the performativity theory. 
Furthermore, the circularity of gender illuminates a conceptual 
dissociation. The theory requires the amalgamation of gender and actions in order 
to deny essential gender qualities, yet it assumes a separation between gender and 
actions. Thus, by assuming essential gender qualities while also denying essential 
gender qualities, a logical contradiction emerges. 
The theory could escape the circularity issue and the logical contradiction 
by adjusting its position on essential gender qualities. If the view accepts essential 
gender qualities, both objections would be resolved. The endless regress would be 
avoided because gender would develop from actions coded according to essential 
gender qualities. Furthermore, the logical contradiction would also dissolve as 
essential gender qualities would differentiate from gendered actions. The theory 
would escape two logical fallacies if it established essential gender qualities as a 
component of gender.  
The weakness of the gender performativity theory is also evident in its 
implications. Extreme gender fluidity is one of them. By establishing gender as 
actions, gender identity becomes transient. If a person executes a continuous set 
of actions coded woman-wise, that person would be considered a woman. 
However, if, in the following moment, that same person executes a continuous set 
of actions coded man-wise, they would be considered a man. The theory makes 
gender extremely fluid, which seems counterintuitive to the general approach to 
gender as an identity that persists through time.  
The gender performativity theory is particularly threatening to identities 
that require essential gender qualities such as the transgender identity. A 
transgender person identifies with essential gender qualities different from the 
ones associated with their genitalia. However, the gender performativity theory 
denies essential gender qualities, therefore invalidating the transgender 
 
 experience. Furthermore, the theory says that gender qualities that the trans 
person identifies with are accidental qualities, contingent on social construction. 
According to this logic, the dysmorphia a trans person experiences would 
disappear if gender expectations were terminated. However, a female trans person 
does not say that they identify with the social expectations of women. They may 
prefer ballet and crossed-legged sitting to football and man-spreading, but a 
person can identify as a man and prefer doing these things. Instead, they are 
saying that they identify with the essential gender qualities of a woman. Although 
gender identification may appear to be an external judgment, it is not. Recall my 
claim that essential qualities are independent of external judgments, in which 
external judgments are the conclusions that people draw from observing another 
person. External judgments require at least two people present, one to act and the 
other to judge. Personal identification, however, requires only one person and is 
not concerned with action, but with emotion. Thus, gender identification is not an 
external judgment. Skeptics of the transgender identity often ask, how can a trans 
woman know what it feels like to be a woman? Well, how does a cisgender 
woman know what it is like to be a woman? I argue that both people are 
referencing essential gender qualities when they describe their gender identity. 
Therefore, essential gender qualities are required for the identities of both the 
transgender woman and the cisgender woman. Without essential gender qualities, 
the personal experiences of both intelligible and unintelligible genders are 
undermined. 
 This is an issue for Butler because she developed her theory with the 
intent to minimize sexism, a view that subjugates women on the basis of essential 
gender qualities. Butler undermines sexism by denying essential gender qualities. 
In the 1999 preface of ​Gender Trouble​, she explains her intention in authoring the 
book. She says, “This book is written then as part of the cultural life of a 
collective struggle that has had, and will continue to have, some success in 
increasing the possibilities for a livable life for those who live, or try to live, on 
the sexual margins” (Ibid., xxvi). She expresses a devotion to sexual minorities 
and presents her work as proof of her commitment to gender equality. However, 
her theory’s denial of essential gender qualities promotes a different form of 
sexism that discriminates against trans people. Although this discussion exceeds 
the realm of metaphysics and ventures into ethics, it is critical to the validity of 
Butler’s argument because she commits the exact evil she intends to devastate.  
The gender performativity theory, like many other non-essentialist views, 
condemns essential gender qualities on the assumption that differences in 
essential qualities entail inequality. I propose that essential gender qualities can 
differ without entailing inequality. Consider the difference between a bachelor 
and a bachelorette. To both identities, being an unmarried person is essential. 
 
 However, the genders of these unmarried people differ. The bachelor must be a 
man, while the bachelorette must be a woman. Inequality is concerned with an 
uneven distribution of justice, but gender differences have no ethical implications. 
Thus, inequality does not follow from the essential differences between a bachelor 
and a bachelorette. Likewise, inequality does not follow from the difference in 
essential gender qualities. Therefore, the non-essentialist’s concern regarding the 
ethical implications of essential gender qualities is unfounded. 
In an attempt to minimize sexism, Butler objects to the binary system of 
gender and then proposes a novel gender theory: the gender performativity theory. 
In response to her objections, I argued that exclusivity and unanimous judgment 
are not necessary to essentiality, which allows the gender matrix to withstand 
Butler’s criticism. Then, I rejected her theory due to its circularity, logical 
contradiction, and exclusivity. I also recommended that Butler give essential 
gender qualities further consideration because the theory would escape these 
issues if it endorsed essential gender qualities. My responses allow the gender 
matrix to emerge from Butler’s objections unscathed and expose weaknesses in 
Butler’s gender performativity theory. My replies are an issue for Butler because, 
according to her view, the matrix institutes inequality on the basis of essential 
gender qualities. Given the problems the performativity theory faces, I urge 
gender theorists, particularly those who strive for gender equality, to resist 
demonizing the existence of essential gender qualities. 
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